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Articulation work is an overlooked requirement for successful human-machine
teams. Articulation work captures the often hidden task management activities
human-human teams regularly perform in response to functional dependencies
amongst team members. While human-human teams demonstrate articulation
work through language, human-machine teams currently do not. Aviation is
replete with examples, from the superficially mundane adaptation inherent in the
turnaround of commercial aircraft to the life-threatening misunderstanding in
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 and Asiana Flight 214. Current research in humanmachine language-mediated interaction has failed to study tasks that are
sufficiently complicated to require articulation work, resulting in a misleading
optimism about the state of the art. More realistic scenarios in human machine
teaming will promote attention to this fundamental limitation and motivate the
development of analogous capability.
For several decades, initiatives such as crew resource management acknowledge team
processes as critical to performance and safety. As both military and commercial aviation evolve
in a stream of technological advances, human-machine teams are a new possibility and goal.
Legacy frameworks for designing automation-based technologies are a natural starting point for
human-machine teams. However assumptions of a static environment make these frameworks
inherently rigid and brittle. In contrast, human-human teams are particularly fluid in the dynamic
task management activities known as articulation work, typically accomplished through natural
language dialogue. While natural language technology could enable human-machine articulation
work, current technology assumes overly simplistic tasks and notions of cooperation, omitting
articulation work as a requirement. This position paper argues that 1) articulation work is critical
to the success of human-machine teams just as it is in human-human teams, 2) frameworks for
designing human-machine teams do not allow for sufficient articulation work, 3) current
language technology does not support articulation work, 4) requirements for articulation work
using dialogue must drive new research and development.
The Importance of Articulation Work
Cooperative work in a dynamic environment necessitates articulation work, that is, task
management activities aimed at functionally decomposing a task, negotiating goals, identifying
dependencies, and divvying up who will do what and when. Articulation work establishes the
team’s varying functional dependencies, that is what team members are committed to doing and
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what other teammates are depending on them to do. Schmidt and Simone (1995) note that
articulation work also serves to improve collaborations as team members:
tacitly monitor each other; they perform their activities in ways that support coworkers’
awareness and understanding of their work; they take each others’ past, present and
prospective activities into account in planning and conducting their own work (p. 17)
Articulation work obtained prominence in research areas focusing on teamwork and team
performance, such as computer supported cooperative work (CSCW; Schmidt and Bannon,
1992; Malone and Crowston, 1990). Importantly, the articulation for a particular situation is not
rigid, it’s adapted as members leave and join the group, become fatigued over time, demonstrate
competence or incompetence, learn new capabilities, or deplete certain resources. The hallmark
of articulation is how it enables robust teamwork in the face of the moment-by-moment
unexpected—uncertainty and environmental perturbations that cause a collision between the
team’s plans and execution. Teams discuss the nature of perturbations, their existing plans and
commitments, and discuss whether or not the perturbations merit a change in approach from one
or more members.
Consider what a team of airport and airline employees must face while performing
turnarounds, the process of taking a plane that’s just arrived, unloading and servicing it, and
loading it again so it can take off again (Wales, O’Neill, Mirmalek, 2002). Articulation work
allows a team to discuss perturbations as well as existing constraints and determine how to
respond in concert, continuing the interdependent activities required to meet the goals. While the
flight schedule determines resourcing staff and equipment, perturbations emerge in the form of
flight delays, changes and cancellations due to weather and mechanical problems. When a flight
is canceled and passengers are moved to another plane by operations personnel, bag handling
personnel have to accommodate these changes. Turnarounds take longer or shorter than
expected, spawning gate changes. Staff members report in ill or equipment breaks, such as fuel
or catering trucks. On close inspection the plan never unfolds exactly as anticipated, but (hidden)
articulation work fills in the gaps, including gaps in the technology, to create the misleading
impression of (mostly) seamless integration.
Historical Human-Machine Frameworks
Legacy frameworks for designing automation-based technologies are a natural starting
point for human-machine teams. Fitt’s (1951) list men-are-better-at, machines-are-better-at
(MABA-MABA) approach seeks to divide responsibility between humans and machines. It
accomplishes this by identifying the (relatively) superior capabilities of humans and machines
and then allocating tasks to whomever or whichever is the most proficient. Allocations suggested
in the Fitt’s list have been commonly understood as static assignments (see de Winter & Dodou
2011 for discussion). Later researchers identified the MABA-MABA approach as overly
simplified and sought to have multiple levels of automation that can be isolated for different
stages (e.g., Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). However, the levels of automation
framework remains rigid. These use static task decompositions rather than allowing for
articulation work. Dynamic function allocation, adaptive automation with machine-initiated
changes, and adaptable automation with human-initiated changes (for a review see Scerbo,
1996), though they provide for change, are insufficient. These approaches have predefined the
possible changes, the notifications of change, and the triggers for changes. Consistent with
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Norman (1996), fine-grained articulation work is always necessary to generate novel team
structures or distribution of responsibilities, provide flexibility in how to notify team members of
change, and use triggers that can’t be predicted or exhaustively programmed. Moreover, changes
in automation status are poorly communicated to human teammates and therefore often missed,
leading to mode confusion and automation surprise (Sarter, Woods & Billings, 1997). While
Woods (1996) recognizes the expansive consequences of new automation on the distribution of
responsibility, the molar time-scale of work practice adaptation neglects the moment-by-moment
adaptation that teams require. Coactive design is a relatively new approach that seeks to detail
human-machine interdependencies (Johnson, Bradshaw, Feltovich, Jonker, van Riemsdijk, &
Sierhuis, 2014), however its breadth lacks specific guidance for dialogue system development.
Functional Dependencies in Aviation Accidents
Machines in use are currently inept at articulation work. Typically, expert humans resort
to workarounds to distribute the functions amongst system members while managing the tasks
supposedly distributed to the machine. Two similar commercial aviation accidents support this
assertion: Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 and Asiana Flight 214. In each of these accidents, the
humans were depending on the machine to perform a function, the machine was not aware the
human was depending on it and the humans were not aware of the machine’s tacit decline of
responsibility. In both accidents, the critical function was to maintain thrust on approach through
the autothrottle.
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951. On 25 February, 2009, Turkish Airlines Flight 1951
crashed during its approach to the Amsterdam Schiphol airport. The first officer as pilot flying
was using Line Flying Under Supervision, which utilizes the autothrottle for airspeed control.
Though the pilot flying and the crew were relying on the autothrottle to maintain the airspeed of
the aircraft on the approach, the aircraft could not be informed of this functional dependency.
Rather, the flight crew attempted to create the airspeed function through management of the
autothrottle mode selections. The approach was higher than the glidepath, so a member of the
flight crew selected the ‘vertical speed’ mode to increase the descent. After this change, the
autothrottle entered RETARD mode, which was displayed on the left and right primary flight
displays, and the autothrottle moved the thrust levers into the idle position. In contrast to crew
assumptions, the autopilot would not maintain airspeed in this configuration. However, the
machine’s exclamation of RETARD to the flight crew was unspecific and did not communicate
the breakdown of the expected function. There are two types of RETARD, one for flight level
changes and one for flaring to land, and the primary flight display annunciation panel does not
distinguish between the two (Silva and Hansman, 2015). The type of RETARD depended on the
altitude information reaching the autopilot, with a threshold altitude of 27 feet. The autopilot
believed the aircraft to be below 27 feet in altitude because the autopilot was receiving and using
erroneous altitude data indicating the aircraft height at -8 feet, which disagreed with the altitude
data presented to the pilot flying. The pilot’s primary flight display showed a conflicting but
correct altitude status, leading to confusion over the situation. Ultimately, the lack of clear
functional dependency and the misunderstanding about the meaning of RETARD led to an
unrecoverable stall and the aircraft crashed killing 9 and injuring 117 (Dutch Safety Board,
2010).
Asiana Flight 214. An accident of similar origin occurred when Asiana Flight 214
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crashed on July 3rd, 2013 during approach to San Francisco International Airport. Asiana has an
informal practice for visual approach of turning off both flight directors and then turning back on
the pilot monitoring’s flight director during the approach (National Transportation Safety Board,
2014). This practice results in the autothrottle entering speed mode and determines a distribution
of functions: the autothrottle maintains airspeed and the pilot flying can focus on pitch and roll.
In Flight 214, the aircraft was above the glidepath and needed to descend. The informal practice
of toggling the flight director was followed ‘loosely,’ both flight directors were not off at the
same time and therefore speed mode was not entered. The pilot flying moved the thrust levers
and inadvertently caused the autothrottle to change to HOLD mode. The HOLD mode created a
breakdown in the function of maintaining airspeed—HOLD deactivated automatic airspeed
control. The burden of recognizing the mode change and the implications for the function being
provided in the approach falls on the flight crew, but they did not note the change to HOLD
mode. These events led the aircraft to descend below the glidepath at a high rate and collide
with a sea wall, killing 3 and injuring 187 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2014).
Both cases hinge on the absence of human-machine articulation dialogue concerning the
retention or abandonment of otherwise tacit commitments to act. These problems with managing
functional dependencies are relatively simple when compared to the envisioned applications for
human-machine teams.
Implications for Human-Machine Communication
Human teams routinely perform articulation work through dialogue. Research into
human-machine communication and natural language dialogue has exerted a great deal of effort
studying and improving clarification of utterances or lexical ambiguities, but not communication,
clarification or negotiation of functional dependencies, which require a more complicated
ontology including agent beliefs (e.g., Clancey, Sierhuis, Damer, & Brodsky, 2005). Many of the
classic human-machine communication tasks do not provide opportunity for articulation work
and therefore do not reveal these deficiencies.
Common application domains for natural language processing, such as shopping and
navigation, are restricted and fail to address the ways in which these tasks vary. As the scope of
artificial intelligence grows and natural language processing technologies become more
integrated into work practices, their applications will not be limited to the subset of activities
with overly simplified team processes. When a richer task is used, such as a collaborative
problem-solving task similar to the board game Clue (Traum & Dillenbourg, 1996), the
proportion of communication spent on articulation work is apparent. In particular, the authors
noted a frequent topic was decomposition of who does what and when. Simple tasks lead to the
impression that a simple ontology can work, whereas a moderately complex task (still quite
simple in comparison to the wild) easily sets a high bar for a rich ontology comprising not just
the task content but the possible conceptualizations and organizations of the cooperation.
Research is needed to push dialogue-mediated tasks into more realistic scenarios that will require
articulation work.
Future Research
The persuasive macro-level case for articulation capability does not provide concrete
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requirements for designers and software developers for building natural language interfaces. We
specify three topics that should shape the research agenda.
Initiate team research utilizing task settings that require articulation. A primary goal
of future research should be to have some aspect of the task that prompts articulation work. We
envision articulation work to be prompted by an element of dynamic disparity in the task context
that differs between partners and thus affects the rate of progress for one of the partners, which
merits announcing to or discussing with the other partner. This could be due to a change in a subgoal of the task, which requires discussion of a change in strategy, approach, sequence, or the
like. This could also be due to introducing a problem that perturbs the existing strategy.
Formalizing a taxonomy of articulation work. A taxonomy is needed to enable
diagnosis of the disconnects between human and machine teammates. Research programs from J.
Allen, H. Clark, and J. Searle provide theoretical inspiration. A critical requirement is a
conceptual distinction between real-time execution and planning activities (Shalin, 2005). It is
the interaction between execution and planning, frequently initiated by a perturbation, that
spawns articulation dialogues. While resources such as Aviation Safety Reporting System and
specific accidents provide data, what is required is the conceptual framework to generalize the
limitations, across instances in aviation and ideally, extending to other domains including
laboratory tasks. Being accountable for providing a specific function is one facet of this
taxonomy. Terminology grounding (e.g., which meaning of RETARD) and explicit task
completion acknowledgement (as in toggling the flight director) is another.
Translate articulation requirements into functional machine analogues. Attempting
to replicate human team members with machines is fraught with philosophical problems and an
impractical near term goal at best. Nevertheless specific functions are well within technical reach
without imbuing technology with human processes, e.g., for clarifying the grounding of
terminology, confirming mode change communications are received, identifying that a functional
dependency will not be upheld. These functions will drive the requirements for natural language
interfaces.
Conclusion
In this position paper, we have argued that 1) articulation work is critical to the success of
human-machine teams just as it is in human-human teams, 2) frameworks for designing humanmachine teams do not allow for sufficient articulation work, 3) current language technology does
not support articulation work, 4) requirements for articulation work using dialogue must drive
new research and development. Human-machine teaming research to date has largely ignored the
challenge of articulation work and cannot ignore it any longer.
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